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ABSTRACT 
There is widespread agreement within academic literature that the NSDAP systematically and 
effectively targeted the rural areas beginning with the agrarian crisis in 1927/8. However, one 
issue is left unresolved: were specific levels of agricultural strata differently attracted to the 
Nazis, and if so, how? In light of the economic and political incentives offered to German 
peasants with differing farm sizes, we expect that regions characterized by middle peasants 
were most likely to have electorally swung in a distinct, asymmetric and relevant way towards 
the Nazis. In order to test this hypothesis, we have used a country-wide data set, which 
includes the original categories of ‘parcel peasants’ (0-2 hectare), ‘small-sized’ (2-5 hectare) 
and ‘medium-sized’ farmers (5-20 hectare). These specific classifications were introduced and 
behaviorally legitimated by the Statistical Office of the Weimar Republic at that time. We 
present the first analysis applying generalised additive models (GAM) for the assessment of 
ecological relations. In order to account for the construction of political spaces – and therefore 
of spatial dependencies, we offer a new mechanism based on stipulations of the electoral 
system. Even after controlling for pre-established impact factors (protestantism, urbanization, 
etc.) and for spatial effects, we identify a clear impact of the agrarian middle classes (5-20 
hectare) on the Nazi vote beginning with the election in July 1932. 
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The Rise of the Nazi Party on the Country-Side 
The established scientific consensus is that by the end of the 1920s the Nazi party achieved a 
major electoral breakthrough in the rural parts of the Weimar Republic (see Heberle 
1934/1963, 1945 Friedrich 1937, Waldman 1973, Falter 1991, Brustein 1996): “compared to 
the urban population, rural voters initially moved only slowly to the Nazis, from 1928 to 
1930. They then moved much more rapidly to the Nazis from 1930 to 1933” (Shively 1972: 
1213). Peasant parties, some of them newly created in the course of the Agrarian Crisis, 
attracted 1.37 million votes in 1928 and reached their peak with 1.62 million votes in 1930. 
Comparing their results in 1930 with the one in the final democratic election in 1933, it turns 
out that they lost 1.18 million votes. Compared with the 17 million voters for the NSDAP in 
March 1933, this would account for about 6.8 percent.1 In short: in 1932, “the NSDAP had 
now clearly established as the most important peasant party” (Corni 1990: 32). Thus, the 
gains in the countryside were an important contribution to the seizure of power. 
Surprisingly, it remains unclear whether agricultural strata played a differential role in the 
electoral dynamics of the Nazi party, i.e.: Did agricultural strata have an impact? If so, which 
agricultural strata had an impact? Early research on the electoral breakthrough of the Nazi 
party asserted that administrative units (Kreise, in the following: counties) characterized by – 
small- and middle-sized farms voted in large numbers for the NSDAP (see Heberle 
(1934/1963, 1945) and Loomis/Beegle (1946)). In his famous analysis of Fascism as a 
specific type of middle class extremism, Lipset (1960: 140-149) considered both the old and 
new middle class as having been susceptible to the NSDAP propaganda. Later studies, 
however, denied the exclusive attraction of the middle class, and instead emphasized the fact 
that the Nazis succeeded in making inroads into to other classes and segments of the 
population (see Falter 1986, Falter 1991: 256-265). More specifically, Falter rejected the rural 
middle class hypothesis. He argued that it was restricted to pecularities of the regions 
investigated by Heberle and Loomis/Beegle and, therefore not generalizable to the whole 
Reich. The main results of his research are: a) the rural breakthrough of the NSDAP in a 
national sense only became visible in the July 1932 election; b) this relationship was much 
stronger, or even only exclusively related to protestant regions; and c) there was definitely no 
effect of specific rural strata, either in protestant, or in catholic regions. Due to their 
heterogeneous social foundations, the Nazis were called the “First German Volkspartei” 
(Falter 1990). Despite the broad social appeal of the NSDAP being undeniable, some authors 
nevertheless continue to seek segment-specific appeal as well as regional variations in support 
(see O’Loughlin 1994, 2002, Brustein 1996, King et al. 2008). Due to the disastrous 
consequences of their electoral success it is still of enormous interest to fully understand how 
this party was able to form the political landscape (see Flint 1998, 2001) and which specific 
economic interests it appealed in a distinguishable and asymmetric way (King et al. 2008, 
1  Note that this constitutes a very ‚conservative‘ estimate. Including peasantry-related losses of, e.g., the 
Economics Party (Wirtschaftspartei) or the Conservative and Liberal Parties, the value would be very much 
higher. 
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Brustein 1996). Studies focusing on the spatial distribution of the Nazi vote found regional 
variations and hot spots indicating differential local and regional campaign effectiveness (see 
Flint 1998, 2001, O’Loughlin et al., 1994, O’Loughlin 2002).  
Studies taking an economic and incentive-oriented view provide evidence that it was the 
owners of small and medium-sized businesses who were attracted by the Nazi propaganda 
(King et al. 2008). This stratum was characterized by its fierce opposition to socialism and to 
large companies and rural estates. Brustein (1996: 63-109) delineates in detail the match 
between the material interests of these segments and the respective policy offered by some of 
the parties: small and mid-sized farmers were asymmetrically and distinctly hit by the 
agrarian crisis, i.e. by the decrease of agricultural prices, and of credit availability, and by 
bankruptcy. The pre-crisis party affiliations of this specific segment tended towards the liberal 
parties such as the DDP and DVP, as well as towards the conservative party DNVP, and 
towards the catholic Center Party. These affiliations began to weaken in 1927 - due to the 
inconsistent position-taking and policy-making of these parties with regard to protective 
agricultural tariffs and subsidies. The peasants’ attempt to organize agricultural movements 
and to establish new parties proved to be only partially successful during 1928. It was the 
distinctive change in programme of the NSDAP, together with their systematic infiltration of 
existing farmers’ organizations which led to a large-scale absorption of small and mid-sized 
farms into the voters for the NSDAP, already visible with the election in 1930.  
Actually, the size of farms constitutes the fundamental factor of rural stratification. After the 
abolishment of feudal corporations in Europe, farm size determined to a large degree the 
social and economic status of peasants. Soil pecularities and the specialization with regard to 
agrarian products (livestock breeding versus cultivation of grains) may also have formed the 
material interests and income of peasants. But, it is the size of farms which provides a reliable 
proxy, and which reflects the incidence of very unbalanced agricultural policy-making in the 
Weimar Republic.2 Therefore, the respective statistical classification is essential in 
determining socially and politically relevant rural strata. The Office of Statistics of the 
Weimar Republic distinguished the following categories:3 
Table 1: Categories of Farm Size  
Farms size (hectare: ha = 10 000 m2) Category 
0-2 ha Parcel farms 
2-5 ha Small farms 
5-20 ha Medium-sized farms 
20-100 ha Large farms 
100 ha and more Large estates 
 
                                                      
2  For details see Brustein (1996: 64 ff) 
3  See Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929). 
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In their early studies of the Nazi vote, Heberle (1934/1945) and Loomis/Beegle (1946) closely 
followed the reasoning of the Official Statistics of the Reich. They expected small farms (2-5 
ha) and medium-sized (5-20 ha) to be the politically most relevant strata with the highest 
likelihood to vote for the Nazi party. Heberle (1934/1963, 1945). Loomis/Beegle (1946) 
corroborated their hypotheses empirically – but only within specific, sometimes highly 
aggregated regions. Later, Waldman (1973) operationalized farm sizes 2-100 ha4 as so-called 
family farms and, therefore, as more politically relevant in regard to Nazi voting.5 Falter 
(1986, 1991), was the first researcher to use a fine-grained country-wide data set. In his 
analyses, he combined the categories of parcel peasants (0-2 ha), small farms (2-5 ha) and 
medium-sized (5-20 ha) farms into one single category which he labeled “medium-sized 
farms” (0-20 ha). Additionally, he also proposed a measure of a so-called “average farm 
size”6 as an indicator of medium-sized farms. Third, he used the indicator of the share of 
family workers as a complementary indicator for medium-sized farms. The respective 
correlations –shown in more detail below – are indeed small or non-existent, sometimes even 
negative. In summary, results relating to the (non-)impact of farm sizes, are in our view still 
inconclusive – theoretically as well as methodically. 
Thus, more than 80 years after the destruction of the Weimar Republic, there remains a 
surprising puzzle: Was the rural Nazi vote, at least beginning with the election in 1930, indeed 
a phenomenon related to radicalized small and midsize farmers – as argued by Geiger (1932), 
Heberle (1934/1963, 1945), Loomis/Beegle (1946), Lipset (1960), Linz (1976) and Brustein 
(1996)? Or was there an identical electoral appeal of the Nazis across all agrarian societal 
strata –as suggested by Falter? Considering the results of Gessner (1981) and Brustein (1996), 
we argue that the complex interplay between the specific economic interests of mid-sized 
farms in the German Reich, and of the dynamics of the agrarian political interest mediation 
after the Agrarian Crisis in 1927/28 led finally to the dramatic erosion of newly founded 
peasant parties, and to the absorption of their adherents by the Nazis.7 In a highly strategic 
way, Hitler reacted programmatically to these developments and used the NSDAP’s party 
machine to create favourable political spaces (see Flint 1998, 2001) in the countryside. For 
the first time, we propose to identify political spaces along those institutions being relevant 
for ‘making votes count’ (Cox 1997), i.e. along electoral districts, see Table 6 in the appendix. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we will use a new data set. This is the first country-wide 
study using the original classification of parcel peasants (0-2 ha), small-sized (2-5 ha) and 
medium-sized farmers (5-20 ha) from the Weimar Republic– i.e.: as introduced by the Office 
of Statistics of the Weimar Republic, and used by the classic regional study by Heberle 
4 Waldman (1973):181, FN.: 3, see also Table 43 on p. 198 where he actually correlates 2-20 ha and 20-100 ha 
with the Nazi vote, respectively. 
5 Actually, this operationalization of Waldman is problematic, as all farms with 10-20 ha employed permanent 
wage workers. Even in the category of 5-10 ha, 40 % of the farms employed permanent wage workers. See 
Jatzlauk 1986: 27 based on Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. More generally, this shows also that the frequent 
equation: ‚family farms = middle class farms‘ is wrong.  
6 I.e., the mean value of farm sizes in a county. 
7  For this hypothesis of a collapse of the agrarian system of political interest mediation, see Wehler 2008: 339, 
Gessner 1981, Jones 1986.  
5 
 
                                                      
(1934/1963, 1945). Additionally, we will for the first time control for electoral districts and 
institutionally stipulated associations of such districts.  
In the following, we will first provide a short overview of the literature detailing the 
agricultural crisis in the Weimar Republic. Then, we will briefly review the quantitative 
literature about the relationship between agricultural structure and the Nazi vote. Based on 
these insights, we will propose new hypotheses with regard to the rural basis of the Nazis. We 
will also suggest a new theoretical rationale for its systematic geographic variation. We will 
test our hypotheses for the first time using the fine-grained original classification of the 
Official Statistics. We will introduce data and present a new statistical approach to the study 
of the Nazi party called generalized additive models (see Keele 2008). Finally, we discuss our 
empirical results, which indicate the clear middle class basis of the rural Nazi vote since the 
1932 elections.  
Agricultural Crisis and Political Interest Representation of Peasants in the Weimar 
Republic  
The importance of the peasantry in the rise of the Nazis was recognized very early (Heberle 
1934/1963, 1945, Friedrich 1937, Loomis/Beegle 1946). As a consequence, the literature on 
the specific rural component in the failure of the first German Republic is extensive. There are 
numerous publications on agricultural policy and on agrarian interest groups by, e.g. Gessner 
(1981), Jones (1986), Brustein (1986), Corni (1990).  
Seen from the perspective of economic history8, the political role of the agricultural sector in 
the Weimar Republic has been surprisingly disproportionate – as compared to its contribution 
to economic production, namely approx. 16 % of domestic net product in the years 1925-1929 
(James 1986: 242). In 1925, approx. 30% (i.e. ca. 9.7 million people) of the workforce was 
still constituted by this sector – which sheds light on its low productivity as compared to the 
industrial sector. Within this sector, the social stratification of the peasantry was highly 
differentiated.9 In sum, more than 2 million peasants earned their living from their 
agricultural business. Only 1 % (N =23 000) of the landowners had very large land estates 
(larger than 100 ha). Peasants owning large quantities of land consisting of 50-100 ha and so-
called full farmers owning 20-50 ha land estates represented 13 % (ca. N=262 000). 
According to the 1925 census, there were 1 006 094 farms of size 5-20 ha, with 919 687 run 
by full time middle peasants. These mid-sized farms relied on 2 162 079 permanently 
employed family members and 577 802 full time land workers. The occurrence of this type of 
farms was evenly distributed across the Reich – with core areas in Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, 
Saxony, Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein etc. (see Jatzlauk 1986, Brustein 1996). It is 
important to note, that most farms with10-20 ha in size relied on permanently employed land 
workers as compared to only 40% of farms with 5-10 ha. Thus, the equation: middle farmers 
8 Useful historical overviews are provided, e.g., by James (1986. 
9 For the following, see the social history-oriented resume by Wehler (2008): 331ff, see also Geiger (1932): 
30-34, Gessner 1981, Jatzlauk 1986. 
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= family farms is not appropriate. Additionally, more than 3 million so-called parcel peasants 
owned 0-2 ha – and they were considered as agricultural ‘proletarians’, e.g. by sociologists 
like Geiger (1932/1967: 33) Whereas large estate owners, large peasants and full peasants 
were able to earn their living from their properties, land owning was not the exclusive source 
of livelihood for parcel peasants. They had to rely on an additional occupation, e.g. serving as 
a land laborer, which was perceived as a clear degradation in the rural status hierarchy. 
Owners with mid-sized farms constituted a segment of the peasantry with distinct material 
interests. Their material interests were distinct from other peasants because German 
agricultural interest mediation and policy-making was under the control of large tenants, e.g. 
tariff policies reflected the political power of very large land owners in Eastern Germany. 
World market prices for wheat began to decline in 1925 and in 1926/27, a global crisis of 
agriculture compelled German farmers to take out loans in order to compensate for price 
reduction and price controls as well as for an increase of taxes. From 1928 to 1932, German 
governments followed a highly protective tariff policy in order to secure wheat prices – 
agrarian protectionism became the “sacrosanct custom” (Wehler 2008: 314). However, these 
interventions did not have identical repercussions across the peasantry – due to its highly 
heterogeneous social and economic structure, most specifically with regard to farm sizes but 
also with regard to product specialization (grains versus cattle). Protective tariff measures 
were beneficial mainly for large owners in Eastern Germany producing wheat. 
This heterogeneity of peasant’s economic interests impeded a national and unified interest 
formation which could be represented by the established parties (see Gessner 1981, Jones 
1986, Brustein 1996). The only peasant party represented in the German parliament 
(Reichstag) until 1928 was the Bavarian Peasants’ Asscociation (Bayerischer Bauernbund). 
Liberal parties (DDP, DVP), the Economics Party (Wirtschaftspartei), as well as Catholic 
(Zentrum, BVP) and Protestant Conservative Parties (DNVP) hosted candidates of the 
peasants’ main interest organization, the Association of Peasants (Bund der Landwirte) on 
their party lists from 1920 to 1928. Inherent organizational tensions between small and 
medium-sized farmers on the one hand, and large farmers on the other, intensified during the 
aggravation of the Agrarian Crisis by the end of the 1920s (see Jones 1986). Peasant 
movements spread, and contributed to the formation of new peasant parties, e.g. in 1927 the 
formation of the German Peasant Party (DBP), and the Christian-National Peasant Party 
(Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolk-Partei (CNBP)) in 1928 – a split off from the 
DVP and the DNVP. In retrospect, these new parties proved to be “flash parties” 
(Rose/Mackie, 1988) or “intermediate hosts”. They mainly attracted the Protestant peasant 
clientele of the conservative and liberal parties in the 1928 election and in the 1930 election – 
but their electorate was by then almost completely decimated in the 1932-1933 elections. 
Peasant parties in Catholic regions, like in Bavaria the Bayerische Bauernbund (BBB), 
experienced a similar decline but to a slightly less extensive degree. In 1933, the BBB lost 
approximately 75 % of its maximum vote share in 1928. From simple inspection of vote 
statistics, it is obvious that peasants exhibited no stable party attachments.10 The reason for 
this electoral volatility of especially small and midsize peasants is due to the evolving 
10  See Shively 1972 for this argument. 
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position-taking and policy-making of parties which were previously considered to represent 
the material interests of these segments (see Brustein 1996: 78 ff). Liberal parties (DVP and 
DDP) oscillated between free market positions and market interventions (agricultural tariffs). 
The party elites of the conservative party DNVP continuously revealed a clearer affinity to the 
large tenants in Eastern Germany. The Center Party was torn between its rural and urban voter 
constituencies.11 These discrepancies became evident in their enacted policies: “By late 1927 
the government had begun preparing emergency assistance programs for the large estates in 
eastern Germany, but similar assistance for Germany’s small and medium-sized farms were 
not given serious consideration until mid-1930” (Brustein 1996: 70). The Nazis realized these 
discrepancies and developed a highly effective campaign in the countryside. In order to 
appeal to peasant voters, Hitler modified the position of the NSDAP program by amending 
point 17 which promised the expropriation of land. He reframed it in such a way that it 
implied only illegitimately acquired land would be collectivized. In March 1930, the NSDAP 
proposed its first anti-crisis crash program for the whole of German agriculture. The agrarian 
program included policies relating to tax and interest reductions, reductions of food imports, 
and subsidies.  
In summary, the interplay between an exogenous shock (the global agrarian crisis), long-
standing structures of agriculture in Germany (rural stratification), and short-term decisions 
by the government led to a situation where the Nazi party was able to present itself as a 
credible party which represented the interests of small and mid- sized peasants. The NSDAP 
offered to overcome the particular numerous peasant parties which were too fragmented and 
powerless in the 1928 and 1930 elections. Thus, the disastrous failure of the system of 
German agricultural interest mediation (see Wehler 2008: 339, Jones 1986) was one major 
cause of the rise of the NSDAP. Small- and mid-sized farmers left their non-responsive parties 
and economically threatened farmers became susceptible to highly effective local and regional 
Nazi propaganda in the country-side. We will discuss the available empirical evidence for and 
against this argument below. 
Agricultural Structure and the Rise of the NSDAP: Main Quantitative Results 
There are surprisingly few quantitative analyses of the electoral success of the Nazi party 
which focus upon the influence of agrarian voters – as compared to the investigation of 
factors such as religious affiliation and unemployment. Originally, Falter considered the 
agricultural support of the Nazi movement as one of the most important open research 
questions (see Falter 1980: 187). One reason for this early focus was that studies at that time, 
such as Childers (1976), specifically investigated the urban origin of the Nazi voters. Second, 
the early studies by Heberle (1934/1963, 1946) and Loomis/Beegle (1946) were considered as 
too regionally focused and therefore not representative (see Falter 1980: 187). However, only 
one regional in-depth study of Franconia by Falter investigated the agricultural bases of the 
11  Social Democratic Party as well Communist Party were, in any case, seen as the parties of expropriation and 
as backing the rural workers. 
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NSDAP in a more detailed manner (Falter 1986). A summary of the national relationship 
between rural stratification and the Nazi vote is provided in Falter’s book (1991: 256-266). 
In the following, we briefly review the respective methodical approaches and the most 
important results of these studies. Heberle’s study “Rural Population and National Socialism” 
was already completed in 1934. The sociological investigation of interest representation in 
Schleswig-Holstein (electoral district Nr. 14) from 1918 to 1932 is now a classic study in 
electoral research and in political geography. The starting point was the early and rapid 
breakthrough of the NSDAP in Schleswig-Holstein beginning with the election in 1930. 
Before that election, Bavaria and especially Franconia (electoral district Nr. 26) exhibited the 
highest NSDAP shares. For the contemporary observer, it was obvious that the success in this 
region resulted from a radicalized peasantry. Inspired by the approach of electoral geography 
and using the method of an internal comparison across different agricultural regions in 
Schleswig-Holstein, Heberle attempts to identify the specific agro-economic incentives of the 
peasants. Specific soil conditions, modes of production and social stratification are considered 
to be crucial determinants of the radicalized voting behavior (see Heberle 1963: 41). Heberle 
proposes a series of highly-differentiated hypotheses, which are tested on the basis of 30 rural 
counties, and using rank correlation. The main result is that regions characterized by small- 
and medium-sized farms exhibited higher electoral shares for the NSDAP: 
“More specifically, it may be said that the classes particularly susceptible for Nazism were 
neither the rural nobility and big farmers nor the rural proletariat, but rather the small farm 
proprietors, very much the rural equivalent of the lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie 
(Kleinbuergertum) which formed the backbone of the NSDAP in the cities.” (Heberle 1945: 
112) 
And: 
“It appears that the Nazis in 1932 had really succeeded the former liberal parties […] as the 
preferred party among the small farmers (2-20 ha).” (ibd: 114) 
Most importantly for our objective is the fact that Heberle already discusses in detail which 
farm sizes (Heberle 1963: 114) should be considered politically relevant with regard to the 
Nazi landslide. He proposes to treat the following combined original official categories of; 
“small and medium-sized” farms (2-20 ha), “large peasant farms” (20-100) ha, “large 
agricultural enterprises” with estates of more than 100 ha, as well as very small farms of 2 ha, 
the rural proletariat- as politically homogeneous strata. Note that these categories closely 
follow the predefined categories of the Official Statistics, which he considered a useful, 
sociologically based system of categorization. 12  
Loomis/Beegle (1946) extend their analyses to the regions of Hanover (electoral district Nr. 
16) and Bavaria (electoral districts Nr. 24-26) in order to vary the confessional context. They 
came to the same conclusions as Heberle (1934/1963): “Elements of Nazism became 
entrenched among those rural middle-class controlled areas whose residents were suffering 
12 See also the discussion of these categories by the sociologist Geiger (1932): 30-34. 
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most acutely from economic insecurity and anxiety accompanying loss of social solidarity” 
(Loomis/Beegle 1946: 725). In his article “The rise of the NSDAP in Franconia in the 
elections 1924-1933”, Falter (1986) extensively investigates the relationship between agrarian 
structure and the Nazi vote in Franconia (electoral district Nr. 26) – a region with extremely 
high vote shares for the NSDAP in 1920s. Some authors considered Franconia a typical case 
study, whereas others have declared it to be atypical, therefore Falter aims to provide a 
systematic comparison of the explanatory power of the variables as applied to the Reich as a 
whole and to the Franconia, respectively. In Franconia, as for the Reich, Falter argues that the 
size of the agricultural sector is correlated with the share of Nazi votes13 in Protestant regions, 
beginning with the elections in 1932. This is contrary to the results of Heberle (and later 
Waldman), who state that the rural breakthrough had already occurred in 1930. Even more 
surprising is the fact that no relationship is demonstrated between mid-sized farms and the 
Nazi vote. This may be due to the author’s method of operationalizing mid-sized farms. In 
contrast to Heberle, Loomis and Beegle, Falter regards the following farm sizes: 0-20 ha, 20-
50 ha, 50-100 ha as politically relevant. Relying on a 0-20 ha recombination of categories (see 
table 7 on p. 333), he detects rather small correlations in Franconia from 1924 to 1930 (0.39, 
0.39, 0.29, 0.30), shifting to negative correlations in 1932 and 1933. This runs counter to 
previous results and expectations. For the Reich, all respective correlations are below 0.20 – 
in his article as well as later in the book (see 1991: 259). Partial correlation coefficients for 
the 0-20 ha category (controlling for shares of Protestants) become even highly negative for 
the 1932 and 1933 election in the article (1986: 333). Nevertheless, Falter concludes in the 
article that the hypothesis of the middle class character of the NSDAP in the countryside can 
be corroborated – at least from the election in July 1932 (Falter 1986: 335). This conclusion is 
mainly based on the use of the share of family workers as an indicator of family-based farms 
(see tables 7a and 7b, p. 333-334). Note, that in his book, Falter (1991) later revises his earlier 
conclusions of the 1986 article by demonstrating the weak correlation between family 
workers and NSDAP shares.14 Only in Protestant counties does the share of family workers 
appear to correlate with Nazi success (see Falter 1991: 261). In sum, Falter concludes here 
that there was no impact of farm sizes in the country-wide study (1991: 265). Note also that 
this far-reaching conclusion is now explicitly based on the variable of “average farm size” 
(1991: 265). Overall, the national testing of the different categories of farm sizes (0-20 ha, 
20-50 ha 50-100 ha, and >100 ha) does not indicate substantial correlations. Remember, 
however, that Geiger (1932) as well as Heberle (1934, 1945, 1963) provide extensive 
discussions on why the political mentality of members of the category 0-2ha – so-called 
parcel peasants – is completely different from the one of small and middle-sized holders: 
“Farm sizes between 0.5 and 2 ha, are, at least on the country-side, held by day laborers and 
laborers for estates. Their income is mainly based on wages, whereas the usage of small 
pieces of land is part of this. Farms of this size occur mainly in districts with large estates. 
13 Using Pearson correlation coefficients and shares of employed persons in the agricultural sector: for 
Franconia: all correlations are less than 0.2, for the Reich: correlations in 1932 are 0.21 and 0.22 respectively, 
and 0.43 in 1933. 
14 See Falter (1991): 258, see also table 7.12 on p. 259 with correlations lower or equal 0.15. 
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Thus, farm sizes of 0.5 to 2 ha and more than 100 ha are complementary.” (Heberle 1963: 
115, translation by the authors) 
As a consequence, the relevance of the agrarian middle class for the success of the Nazis in 
the whole Reich is still an open question. 
Political geographers (Flint 1998, 2001, O’Loughlin et al. 1994, 2002) have convincingly 
shown that the electoral performance of the NSDAP was highly variable locally and 
regionally. This spatial fragmentation is indicated by statistical dependencies which suggest 
an active construction of political spaces at that time. In line with the highly influential book 
by Cox (1997) ‘Making Votes Count’, we will argue that the ‘electoral system’, i.e. “the set of 
laws and party rules that regulate electoral competition between and within parties” (Cox 
1997: 38) are the crucial mechanism of generating distinct political spaces. Electoral legal 
stipulations determine the specific method of translating votes into seats. They influence the 
interaction between partisan elites’ local strategies and local cleavage structures. These rules 
determine the expectations of elites as well as of voters. A first crucial level of political co-
orientation have been the political territories (Lander and Prussian Provinces) of the Weimar 
Republic represented in the second federal chamber (Reichsrat, see Art. 60 of the 
constitution), They organized elections at the Lander level – and therefore constituted a 
natural relevant frame for the construction of political spaces. Second, according to the Law 
on the Electoral System (see especially Appendix of § 7 
(http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de19-33/reichswahl24-anlage.pdf)), the Weimar Republic 
consisted of N = 35 electoral districts (Wahlkreise) and of N = 16 so-called Associations of 
electoral districts (Wahlkreisverbände). Transferring votes into mandates required several 
steps where the aforementioned levels were crucial: electoral district lists received a mandate 
for 60 000 votes (well-known). Although relatively unknown, the second step is highly 
important for strategic campaigning: the remaining votes in a electoral district (n > 60 000) 
were added up within these Associations of electoral districts. This implies, that campaign 
strategies can be expected to be more homogenous within electoral districts and within such 
Assocations of electoral districts. Thus, geographic clustering should occur especially at the 
level of electoral districts and Associations of electoral districts. In terms of how political 
spaces are constructed, this means that rational parties and candidates take into account the 
rules of the electoral system when targeting tactically mobile voter segments.  
Hypotheses 
In line with the conclusions of Heberle (1934), Geiger (1932), Loomis/Beegle (1946) and 
Linz (1976), we expect that middle farmers (5-20 ha) were especially vulnerable to the rural 
campaigns of the NSDAP. Due to its specific structural economic position and confrontation 
with the structure of the party systems, this stratum was highly electorally unstable as it had 
no long-term loyalties towards mainstream parties in the established German cleavage 
structure (see Shively 1972, Linz 1976). As the Christian-national Peasant Party / German 
Peasants (Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei (CNBP ) / Deutsches Landvolk) 
were successful in 1928 and 1930 at organizing small- and middle farmers, we expect the 
major rural breakthrough of the Nazis to occur only in 1932. The political representation of 
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the proprietors of farmer-capitalist agricultural enterprises was mainly organized by the 
Protestant Conservative Party (DNVP), and the Catholic Parties (Center Party, Bavarian 
People’s Party, Bavarian Peasants’ Alliance) until the agricultural crisis. We formulate the 
following hypotheses to be tested with our new data: 
Hypothesis 1 (Heberle 1934/1963, 1946, Loomis/Beegle 1946, Linz 1976, Brustein 1996 
etc.): 
The higher the proportion of middle peasants (5-20 ha), the higher the vote shares of the 
NSDAP since July 1932. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Heberle 1934/1963, 1946, Loomis/Beegle 1946, Linz 1976, Brustein 1996 
etc.): 
The higher the proportion of proletarian parcel peasants (0-2 ha), the lower the vote shares of 
the NSDAP. 
 
Hypothesis 3a (Falter 1986, 1991): 
The relationship between the proportion of proletarian parcel peasants (0-2 ha), small-sized 
peasants (2-5 ha), and middle peasants (5-20 ha) respectively, and the vote shares of the 
NSDAP is identical. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (Falter 1986, 1991): 
There is no relation between the proportion of the composite stratum (0-20 ha) with the 
electoral results of the NSDAP. 
 
Inspired by mass theories, Waldman (1973) argued that Protestant voters in general and 
Protestant peasants were socially disintegrated, and therefore concluded: “…that religion 
intervened between strain and the political reaction to it, that is that Protestants reacted 
differently to strain than did Catholics.” (Waldman 1973: 94). As a consequence, he expects a 
“continuum of Nazi voters” (1973: 123), and specified this hypothesis as an additional 
interaction term between the proportion of Protestants and the proportion of workforce in the 
agricultural sector. Following Brustein (1996) and King et al (2008) which rather accentuate 
the geographic variation of material interests, we transfer this hypothesis to our incentive-
based approach of peasant voting and reformulate the Waldman (1973) conjecture as follows: 
Hypothesis 4 (Waldman 1973):  
There is an interaction effect between the proportion of middle peasants (5-20 ha) and the 
proportion of Protestants: The positive association between the proportion of mid-sized 
peasants and the vote shares of the NSDAP increases with the proportion of Protestants. 
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In accordance with political geography inspired contributions (Flint 1991, 2001, O’Loughlin 
et al. 1994, 2002), we expect regionally clustered voting behavior. On the basis of arguments 
which emphasize the importance of electoral systems in the strategic coordination between 
elites and voters (Cox 1997), we expect that these political spaces are co-constructed as a 
consequence of the duality between the local distribution of policy preferences and campaign 
activities of parties. Therefore the boundaries between these spaces, follows the delineation of 
political territories of the Federation represented in the second federal chamber (Reichsrat), 
and, therein, the electoral districts and so-called Association of electoral districts:  
Hypothesis 5: 
There are distinct regional electoral spaces which are expected to follow established political 
territories of the federation and, therein, electoral districts and Associations of electoral 
districts.  
Data and Operationalization 
In the following analysis, we use election data for seven elections (1924-1933) in the Weimar 
Republic as provided by Falter.15 This data set also includes extensive socio-demographic 
variables, mainly based on census data for the years 1925 and 1933. In addition to the already 
available number of employees in the agricultural sector in 1925 and 1933, we had to collect 
detailed information with regard to rural stratification. Using the 1925 census,16 we put 
together data for the respective workforce of different farm sizes. We maintained the original 
categories of parcel farmers (0-2 ha), small farmers (2-5 ha), middle farmers (5-20 ha), large 
farmers (20- 100 ha), and large estate farmers with more than 100 ha. We also control for 
shares of Protestants, the degree of urbanization and the share of unemployed. With regard to 
socio-demographic data, we rely mainly on the 1925 census. For the unemployment rate, we 
use the 1933 census for the last three elections (1932-1933). In order to account for existing 
spatial effects (see Flint 1998, 2001, O’Loughlin et al. 1994, O’Loughlin 2002), regional 
indicator variables will be used. These regional indicator variables are designed to capture 
important electoral processes. They divide the Weimar Republic into 23 political regions 
based on preexisting administrative entities which approximate the electoral districts.17 A 
detailed list of the variables and regions is provided in the appendix. We expect the electoral 
districts to demonstrate similar campaign strategies internally and, therefore, to mirror 
correlated spatial processes. 
15  Source Gesis, ZA8013. 
16 Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929). 
17  First we started with the 18-24 Laender of the Weimar Republic. However, Prussia, accounting itself for 3/5 
of the territory, was extremely heterogeneous composed. This is the reason why Falter et al (1986:86) 
proposed to consider in this case additionally the Prussian provinces and their specific elections. We follow 
this suggestion. The Laender and the provinces also correspond quite closely to the electoral districts (N = 
35). In a second step we combine several Laender / provinces. Our final regions, see Table 6 in the Appendix, 
are a mixture between Association of electoral districts and electoral districts while conserving the political 
territories of the Weimar Republic. 
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Like Falter (1991), we apply all models at the county level (Kreise). Changes of the 
boundaries of counties over time, i.e. the complete or partial fusion of two counties, 
necessitated the merging of some of the counties. For the analysis, information for 849 
counties will be available. 
The share of the NSDAP vote is our dependent variable. Percentages are based on the number 
of those being entitled to vote. In order to visualize the electoral geography of the Nazis and 
the spatial distribution of our key variable – the spread of mid-sized farms – we created a 
digital map of the Weimar Republic including all counties.18 We fitted models for every 
individual election in the period 1924 to 1933.  
Statistical Model 
Contrary to contributions aiming to make inferences from the aggregate data level to 
individual behavior,19 we are striving for the following methodical objectives: 
1. We will provide the first critical test of whether counties characterized by mid-sized 
farms (5-20 ha) were susceptible to Nazi propaganda to a higher degree than counties 
characterized by other farm sizes. As the only country-wide test by Falter (1986, 1991) 
used a “composite” variable (0-20 ha), we are the first to separate the impact of 
different rural strata on the Nazi vote.  
2. We will for the first time account for political spaces by including indicators for 
electoral districts, which is expected to capture spatial autocorrelation.  
3. We will apply for the first time advanced generalized additive models (GAM) to the 
ecological analysis of the Nazi vote. 
Thus, we do not intend to draw direct conclusions from the aggregate level to the individual 
level. Our estimated effects will only indicate whether and how the proportion of mid-sized 
peasants in the counties covary with the electoral outcome of the NSDAP. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to apply a generalized additive model (GAM) for this 
objective.20 This statistical approach has the advantage that no restrictive prior assumptions 
with regard to the relationship between the covariables and the response have to be made. The 
relationship is calculated as a smooth function with the exact form defined by the data. For the 
estimation we are using penalized splines.21 Due to the large number of covariables, a 
restrictive number of knots has been chosen.22 Models were fitted by applying the empirical 
18 Based on a map in Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929). 
19  See e.g. King et al. (2008). 
20  GAMs were originally proposed by Hastie and Tibshrani (1986). See also Beck and Jackman 1998. A useful 
recent overview is provided by Keele (2008). 
21 For detailed explanations, see Eilers and Marx (1996) and Ruppert, Wand and Carroll (2003). 
22 Five knots were chosen. Thus, an acceptable data-to-degree-of-freedom ratio higher than 1 to 10 can be 
preserved. 
Bayesian approach implemented in BayesX.23 From this family of models, we implemented 
the general additive logistic regression model adjusted for overdispersion. For the comparison 
of models we are relying on the generalized cross validation score (GCV).24 Each election 
was considered independently. The models are of the following form: 
 (1) 
πi is the proportion of NSDAP voters in county i. β0 is the global intercept. The spatial part 
consisting of the regional indicator variables is represented by βr,i. Smooth functions are 
estimated for all metric control variables. Terms in squared brackets are not included in all 
models. The main model consists of the percentage of Protestants, the share of parcel peasants 
(0-2 ha), the share of small peasants (2-5 ha), the share of middle peasants (5-20 ha) and the 
share of large farmers (20-100 ha), percentages of workers, workers in industry and handcraft, 
and the urbanization level. The 1933 unemployment rate is exclusively considered in the 
models for the three elections 1932-1933. 
As the relationship (sB5-20ha(xB5-20ha)) (1a) proved to be almost linear, additional models with 
linear middle farmer components (βB5-20ha) (1b) for the elections 1930-1933 are also provided. 
The test of hypothesis 4 requires a different approach: To estimate the possible changing 
effect of the middle farmer percentage depending on the percentage of Protestants, a varying 
coefficients (βB5-20ha (xProt)) (2) approach (Hastie/Tibshirani 1993) is chosen. Again, a smooth 
functional relationship between the βB5-20ha and the percentage of Protestants is specified, and 
given the estimated function for each xProt, a separate βB5-20ha can be extracted from the model. 
To identify spatial autocorrelation between the covariates and the residuals we are using 
Moran´s I25. Note also, that the model specification of GAM automatically implies a 
weighting of the number of eligible voters in a county by using the binomial distribution.  
Descriptive Analysis 
A brief description of the relationship between our main variables, i.e. between the share of 
farmers with mid-sized farms (5-20 ha), and the proportion of the NSDAP in the respective 
elections, is depicted by the respective scatterplots in Figure 1. There is no detectable pattern 
in the period from 1924 to 1930. In the 1924 and 1928 election, it can be seen, that the 
NSDAP receives higher vote shares in districts with low percentages of mid-sized farms. 
                                                      
23  Belitz et al.(2009), Fahrmeir, Kneib and Lang (2004). 
24  Craven and Wahba (1979). 
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25  Using a binary neighborhood structure (shared border) and row standardized weights. 
 
Figure 1: Share of Middle Farmers (5-20 ha) and Election Results of the NSDAP 
This is the period when the Nazis had their strongholds in the cities instead. In the September 
1930 election, this pattern becomes a clear non-relation, indicating that the urban-to-rural 
realignment (Waldman 1973) is clearly under way, but in no way yet complete. Note the 
different scaling of the y-axis, which is due to the enormous growth of this party already in 
this election.  
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The expected relationship becomes visible for the first time in the July 1932 elections. In 
order to explore visually whether there is indeed an interaction effect between high shares 
Protestants and (these) rural segments (Waldman 1973), we colored cases according to their 
dominant confessional affiliation. 
In our analysis it became clear that the two groups had already started to separate in the 1930 
election. This tendency steadily sharpens until the final 1933 election. A nearly monotonically 
increasing functional form of the Catholic data cloud, however, becomes obvious only in this 
last election. 
Comparing these figures with the ones where the x-axis is represented by the share of small 
farmers (2-5 ha) (see appendix: Figure 9), a very similar tendency appears. In contrast, a 
comparison with proletarian parcel farmers of 0-2 ha (see appendix: Figure 8) demonstrates a 
completely different development. This may be a first indication that a combination of farms 
of 0-20 ha is not appropriate due to behaviorally different populations.  
Table 2: Correlation Between Percentages of Workforce in Different Categories 
 0–2 ha 2–5 ha 5–20 ha 20–100 ha 100+ ha 
0–2 ha  1.000  0.479  0.073  0.021  0.166 
2–5 ha   1.000  0.610 -0.003 -0.199 
5–20 ha    1.000  0.450  0.015 
20–100 ha     1.000  0.380 
100+ ha      1.000 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for shares of the different farm sizes. Commonly, a 
moderate correlation exists between the agriculture variables for neighbor groups, whereas the 
correlation between the non-neighbor groups is generally low. The largest correlation can be 
observed between the occurrence of small and mid-sized farms (0.61). Note that the 
correlation between the occurrence of parcel peasants (0-2 ha) and mid-sized (5-20 ha) 
peasants is extremely low: 0.073. We interpret this as a second indication that these two 
categories should not be combined. There is a slightly larger correlation between proletarian 
parcelists and the large estates – just as Heberle (1963) observed and Linz (1976) expected. 
Figure 2 presents the electoral geography of the NSDAP for the November 1932 election 
when the urban-to-rural shift was under way. We use a smooth color gradient ranging from 
full white to full gray. Some regions, especially parts of East-Prussia, Silesia and Bavaria 
exhibit comparatively lower results for the NSDAP.  
Commonly, this structure mirrors the confessional structure of the counties. In counties that 
were predominantly Catholic, the NSDAP had lower results in this election, whilst in counties 
that were predominantly Protestant, the NSDAP achieved higher results. Therefore, most 
studies analyzing these elections so far concluded that the religious affiliation is the main 
determinant explaining the success of the NSDAP. 
However, the geographic spread of the rural structure may have a distinct and separate impact 
on the Nazi vote. Therefore, Figure 3 shows the corresponding percentages of the workforce 
in mid-sized farms (5-20 ha). The Southern part of the Reich is characterized by high 
percentages of middle peasants, but this is also seen in northern areas, such as Hanover. 
Visual inspection also shows that the agricultural structure varies to a higher degree within 
electoral districts as compared to shares of the NSDAP.  
Figure 2: Elections Results NSDAP, November 1932, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 
(1929) and Gesis ZA8013 
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Figure 3: Workforce in Middle Farms (5-20 ha), Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 
(1929) and Census 1925 
Therefore, the construction of political spaces seems not to be fully determined by the 
agricultural structure. Next we proceed to a multivariate test of our hypotheses. 
Model Results 
The following figures present the key results of the models (1a). We only present the effects 
for four elections: May 1928, September 1930, July 1932 and March 1933.26 In order to 
compare the impact magnitude of middle farmer percentages (Figure 5) with the well-
established influence of confessional affiliation patterns, we first present the estimated smooth 
functions for the percentage of Protestants (Figure 4). We display identical y-scales. 
The relationship between the proportion of Protestants and the NSDAP is clearly strong, and 
exhibits a time-stable similar-shaped non-linear function. This association is only slightly 
weakened over time. The general shape of the relationship is very similar for all elections.  
The picture is clearly different for the middle farmers (5-20 ha). The estimated effect is 
evidently not identical over time. In the election 1928, a negative association between the 
18 
 
                                                      
26 Due to space limits, results for all other variables and elections are presented in the appendix. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Smooth Effect of the Share of Protestants on the Share of the NSDAP 
shares of middle farmers and NSDAP voting can be seen. The success of the NSDAP is 
higher in counties with a small share of middle farmers. In the 1930 election, there is almost 
no association between the share of the middle farmers and proportion of NSDAP. However, 
for the elections in July 1932 and March 1933, a clear positive, almost linear association 
becomes obvious: The success of the NSDAP is increasing with the share of the middle 
farmers. 
Therefore, we conclude, that hypothesis 1 is corroborated by this data. As the functions for the 
last four elections resemble a linear relationship, we additionally estimated separate models 
(1b) with a parametric linear middle peasant component for this elections (see Table 3).  
This estimation provides an unambigous positive coefficient, where the size changes from 
September 1930 to July 1932 by a factor of approximately 6 ! If we consider two fictional 
counties, which only differ in their middle farmer share, we can elucidate the estimated effect. 
If we assume that county 1 has 0% and the county 2 has 30% middle farmers then using the 
coefficient of July 1932, i.e. the value of 1.544, the odds for the NSDAP shares are 1.59 times 
higher for county 2. If county 1 would have a NSDAP share of 20%, we can expect a share of 
28% in county 2. In sum, we conclude that hypothesis 1 is corroborated - non-parametrically 
as well as parametrically. 
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Figure 5: Estimated Smooth Effect for the Share of Middle Farmers (5-20 ha) on the Share of 
the NSDAP 
According to our estimation results (see appendix: Figure 23), neither small farmers (2-5 ha) 
nor proletarian parcel peasants (0-2 ha) exhibit the same positive relationship as the middle 
farmers in the three elections 1932-33. Whereas for the small farmers a similar negative 
relationship can be identified for the 1924 and 1928 elections, no relationship can be detected 
for the elections 1930 and 1932-1933. Contrary, the estimated function for the parcel farmers 
even reveals a small positive relationship for the elections until 1930. However, there is no 
effect for the elections 1932-1933. Therefore, we conclude, that hypotheses 2 and 3a have to 
be refuted. 
Table 3: Estimated Parameters for Middle Peasant Shares (Excerpt of the Full Model) 
Election Point estimate 95 % - Confidence Interval 
Sept 1930 0.258 -0.747 1.264 
July 1932 1.544  0.819 2.268 
Nov 1932 1.817  1.015 2.620 
Mar 1933 1.696  1.024 2.369 
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The Experimentum Crucis: Is Combining Farm Sizes 0-20 ha Appropriate? 
In the so far sole country-wide study which investigates the hypothesis of a middle peasant 
impact, Falter (1986, 1991) combined the categories of the Official Statistics of the German 
Reich for proletarian parcel peasants (0-2 ha), small peasants (2-5 ha) and middle peasants 
(5-20 ha). We already presented several findings that indirectly contradicted this research 
strategy and, thus, question the far-reaching conclusion according to which there was no 
middle-stratum-related voting behavior on the countryside.  
This conclusion actually constituted a revision of the important results of Heberle (1934/1963, 
1946), Loomis/Beegle (1946) and many other scientists. In order to show that the combination 
of these categories is inappropriate, we specify exactly this composite variable (0-20 ha) with 
the same model as before, just replacing the separate variables (see Figure 6). For the 1928 
election, we see a weak negative relationship, with a local maximum at 12-14 percent. For the 
1930 election, the estimated function is a rather horizontal line. Most importantly, for the 
elections July 1932 and March 1933, only a minor positive effect is visible, mainly for 
percentages of the composite variable mid-sized farmers higher than 50 percent. A 
comparison of the strength of the estimated effect shows that the combined consideration 
 
Figure 6: Estimated Smooth Effect for the Composite Variable (0-20 ha) on the Share of the 
NSDAP 
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reduces a clear positive effect to a non-effect. We conclude, therefore, that hypothesis 3b 
cannot be refuted. In conjunction with our results for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3a, we deduce that 
the measurement of middle peasants via a composite variable (0-20 ha) is inappropriate. 
In order to allow a direct comparison with the linear coefficients fitted for the middle farmers 
(5-20 ha) for the elections 1930-1933, linear models were also fitted for the composite 
variable (0-20 ha): 
Table 4: Estimated Parameters for the Composite Variable (Excerpt of the Full Models) 
Election Point estimate 95 % - Confidence Interval 
Sept 1930 0.086 -0.361 0.533 
July 1932 0.260 -0.067 0.588 
Nov 1932 0.420  0.056 0.784 
Mar 1933 0.543  0.239 0.847 
 
By comparing these results with the estimates in Table 3, it is possible to identify striking 
differences. The estimated coefficients are obviously much smaller for the composite variable. 
Additionally, there is no overlap between the estimated confidence intervals for the last three 
elections as compared to Table 3. This indicates that there is a significant difference between 
the estimated effects, and the combined consideration of the different farm sizes is not 
justified. 
Comparing the generalized cross validation scores (GCV) of the seven smooth models for the 
separate middle farmer category (5-20 ha) and the composite variable (0-20 ha), almost 
identical value can be found in the December 1924 and September 1930 election models. For 
all other elections, the GCVs for the models with separate middle farmer category are lower, 
with the largest numeric difference occurring between the models for the two elections in 
1932. 
In addition to the model with a separate specification of middle peasants (5-20 ha), we also 
examined whether the combination of small and middle farmers into one group (2-20 ha) 
changes the result. Note, that this resembles the strategy of Heberle (1934/1963, 1946) and 
Loomis/Beegle (1946) for their regional studies. We found only minor differences as 
compared to the exclusive specification of the middle peasants (5-20). Based on the separate 
estimated results for the small farmers (2-5 ha) which showed almost no effect for the 
elections 1930-1933, we conclude that a separate specification of middle peasants (5-20) is 
most appropriate. 
Testing Waldman’s Continuum Conjecture for the Case of Middle Peasants 
Is there an interaction effect between the share of Protestants and the share of the agricultural 
sector? Based on bivariate correlations and tree analyses, Falter concludes that Waldman was 
correct in expecting that “the NSDAP shares increase more or less steadily/monotonically 
from the rural Catholic precincts to the rural Protestant districts, with the urban precincts in-
 
Figure 7: Estimated Smooth Linear Coefficients Function for the Share of Middle Farmers 
Depending on the Percentage of Protestants with 95% - Confidence Interval 
between on this continuum” (Falter 1986: 327). We test the Waldman hypothesis, for the first 
time using the share of middle peasants (Hypothesis 4). 
Applying the GAM approach, we specify a model (2) with varying coefficients 
(Hastie/Tibshirani 1993) for the last four elections separately in order to test whether the share 
of Protestants was an “effect modifier”. For each percentage point of Protestants, the linear 
coefficient for the middle farmers is now presented. 
All four functions display a positive relationship between the middle peasant coefficient and 
the percentage of Protestants. For the 1930 election model, no effect can be detected, as the 
whole x-axis is in the confidence interval. The functions for the last three elections indicate 
that the positive association, i.e. the coefficient of the share of the middle peasants increases 
when the share of Protestants is higher. This effect is most pronounced in the election in 1933. 
Only in almost completely homogenous Protestant districts, does this relationship weaken. In 
conclusion however, these results clearly corroborate Waldman’s expectations for the 
1932-1993 elections. 
Regional Electoral Spaces 
Finally, we assess the potential of our hypothesis according to which electoral districts and the 
stipulation for Associations of electoral districts allow us to distinguish spatially distinct 
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political spaces – and to absorb thereby effectively spatial heterogeneity as well as spatial 
autocorrelation.  
The results of the estimation are presented in Figures 16 - 22 and Table 7 in the appendix. We 
display point estimators of the logistic regression model. For the visualization, the estimated 
effects are centered in order to avoid interpretation with regard to a reference category, and to 
ease comparison between the elections. Since the coefficients for the elections in 1924 and 
1928 have relatively high values as compared to the following elections, different scales are 
used for these three elections. Positive coefficients (colour blue) relate to higher shares of the 
NSDAP in the respective region. More specifically, a coefficient of 0.5 means that the odds of 
voting for the NSDAP are increased by the factor exp(0.5) = 1.65 as compared to a region 
with coefficient 0 after adjustment for all variables in the model 
Both elections in 1924 had a similar the pattern. Some regions, especially Bavaria, province 
Posen and Mecklenburg-Schwerin / Mecklenburg-Strelitz exhibit strong positive effects, 
while most regions have small or strong negative effects. The general picture changed in the 
1928 elections. While the strongest effects can still be found in Bavaria, further positive 
coefficients are now primarily in the western part of the Weimar Republic. Another region 
with a strong positive effect is the state Oldenburg. A strong contrast between the regions 
continues to be visible. 
The estimated regional effects for the 1930 election are much lower than for the elections 
1924 – 1928. While the general landscape remains similar, the contrast between the regions is 
now lower. A notable change is that in the eastern part of the Weimar Republic, the province 
lower Silesia exhibits a positive effect. Bavaria manifests the highest positive deviations, 
while the neighbouring Württemberg offers the strongest negative effect. Notable differences 
can be identified in the July 1932 election. While still demonstrating positive affinities to the 
NSDAP, Bavaria no longer shows the highest deviation. Regions in the eastern part of the 
Weimar Republic have positive coefficients. The general shape of the estimated electoral is 
similar for the election in November 1932. However, our analyses of the election in March 
1933 indicate remarkable differences. Disparities between the regions become even lower.  
Overall, Bavaria manifests positive differences in all seven elections. The estimated effects 
are the strongest in the first elections and converge to the average in the later elections. The 
estimated effects for the southern part are always higher than the effects for the northern part. 
Another constant are the negative effects for the state Württemberg. In other regions, the size 
and also the sign of the effects change. For example, some of the regions, which can be 
considered as strongholds in the first elections, have negative coefficients in the last elections. 
In sum, our approach, using the Associations of electoral districts while still conserving the 
political territories as closes as possible proved to be highly appropriate for the description of 
the electoral space. There are highly distinct regions in the early years. However, the amount 
of differences decreases over the years thus indicating an assimilation of political spaces. 
The theoretically justified choice of our regional indicator variables absorbs spatial 
autocorrelation quite well. As a consequence, the residuals exhibit only small correlations. We 
present the maps of the residuals for the models (1a) for the last four elections in the appendix 
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(see Figures 26 - 29). Moran’s I values for this models are 0.24 (Sept 1930), 0.29 (July 1932), 
0.28 (Dec 1932), 0.25 (Mar 1933) indicating some minor remaining additional spatial 
structure.27 As spatial effects do not run counter to our main hypothesis, and the share of 
middle farmers which is our main variable of interest, also has a spatial structure with a 
Moran’s I value of 0.40, we decided to follow the argumentation of Wakefield and included 
no further spatial effects.28  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The higher the share of middle peasants (5-20 ha), the higher the success of the Nazi party 
since the July 1932 election. With this new finding, we contribute one very important facet to 
the understanding of the electoral success of the NSDAP: The swing towards the NSDAP in 
the 1930s had also a rural basis, and this was more pronounced in counties with higher 
proportions of agrarian middle classes. Therefore, the rural voter transitions had a clearly 
asymmetric structure. As a result, these results crucially improve our understanding of the 
socio-economic and geo-structural bases of the failure of the Weimar democracy. Surprisingly, 
this is the first statistical analysis ever to test this specific relationship for the whole country 
based on low-level county (Kreise) data. We have argued and empirically substantiated this 
hypothesis with new and original data, which indicate that previous (non-)results of Falter 
(1986, 1991) are inconclusive – due to a non-justified recombination (0-20 ha) of the original 
categories of the official statistics. Our results are in line with other previous results for 
selected regions, e.g. by Heberle (1946, 1963) and Loomis/Beegle (1946). The rural Nazi vote 
since at least 1932 has been higher in counties characterized by farm sizes of 5-20 ha. This is 
due to the high congruence between the programmatic offers of the Nazi Party and the 
politico-economic interests of this segment. However this occured only after previous natural 
supply parties like the liberal parties DDP, DVP, the Conservative Party DNVP and, to a lesser 
degree, the Center Party were considered incredible during the course of the agrarian crisis by 
middle peasants. Obviously, proletarian parcel farms as well as small farmers had distinct 
politico-economic incentives as compared to middle farmers.29 The failure of the political 
supply side during the agrarian crisis made this latter segment especially vulnerable to the 
aggressive campaign of the Nazis at the countryside. Naturally, this campaign proved to be 
effective to varying degrees as we can see from our new indicators capturing relevant political 
spaces, i.e. electoral districts. 
From a macro-sociological perspective, these new insights are highly important. Here, the 
peasantry is attributed a crucial role in the process of modernization, of democratization, of 
political crises, and of revolutions (see Moore 1966, Huntington 1968, Taylor 1988, Skocpol 
1979). According to Wolf (1969), it’s the “middle peasantry” which is the “tactically mobile 
peasantry.” The author explains this fact by the discrepancy between a continuing traditional 
27  The values for the varying coefficients models (2) are almost identical. 
28  We follow Wakefield (2007), who discusses the problem of spatial modeling in a study on disease mapping. 
He argues, that the inclusion of further spatial effects could seriously cover substantial underlying effects and 
that the problem could only be solved by using individual data, which are obviously not available. 
29 See Brustein (1996: 85-89). 
26 
 
way of life and, at the same time, the increasing involvement in and dependence on the 
market. This discrepancy is most painful for the middle peasantry. Authors like Hobsbawm 
(1973), Moore (1966), and Linz (1976), indeed, considered the role of the German peasantry 
as crucial for the understanding of the take-over of the Nazis and the abolishment of 
democracy. According to Linz, the rural stratum most susceptible to fascism are so-called 
“proprietors of farmer-capitalist agricultural enterprises” (Linz 1976: 375). They are highly 
market-oriented and therefore politically sensitive to economic crises and government 
policies. As long as they rely on non-family hired workforce, they are also hostile to socialist 
and communist parties. Contrary to consumptive or subsistence peasants, they have no 
loyalties to traditional parties: “The political alternatives likely to appeal to these strata are: 
various centrist and undefined forces; all kinds of liberalism at the end of the century; 
conservative-nationalistic, anticlerical-conservative, peasant ideologies of various kinds; 
nontraditional ‘democratic’ conservative authoritarianism; Bonapartism, Boulangism, and the 
like; and finally, in the thirties, fascism.” (Linz 1976: 376).  
In his comparative analysis of agrarian movements in Europe 1850-1940, Urwin (1980) 
demonstrates in detail the “interconnection between agrarian structure, socio-economic 
change and political activity” (Urwin 1980: 12). Urwin refers to the success of the Nazis in 
Bavaria, Hessie, to Rexism in Belgium (see also Brustein 1988) and the Quisling in Norway 
as well as to diverse agro-fascist movements in Eastern Europe (Urwin 1980: 182). The anti-
system potential of peasants was always unleashed “...whenever the agrarian parties failed to 
react to the current economic programs of the peasantry” (Urwin 1980: 182). 
However, this processes not only differed so dramatically over countries, but also within 
countries we observe the construction of quite different political spaces. We argued for the 
first time that the effectiveness of space construction should be visible when comparing 
political territories of a federation (holding their own elections) and of electoral districts 
therein. As Cox (1997: 38) stated, “electoral laws and rules regulate how parties nominate 
candidates, how citizens vote and how those votes are counted”. This forceful mechanism 
affects expectation formation both at the level of the elites as well as the voters – and should 
therefore be identifiable as a distinct political space. Actually, we not only provide a scale for 
the geographical variation of these spaces, we also have shown that accounting for these 
spaces absorbs spatial dependencies in both substantial as well as statistical manner.  
Finally, we emphasize that this is the first time that generalized additive models (GAM) have 
been used in the context of electoral aggregate data analysis, thus allowing us to identify non-
linear relationships. We selected this statistical strategy because we consider it an important 
step for uncovering spatial and social peculiarities of voter transitions.  
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Appendix 
A. Data and Data Description 
Table 5: Variables and their Operationalization 
Variable Source Base population Minimal level of aggregation 
Election Results 
NSDAP 
Different Sources 
(ZA8013) 
Eligible Voters for this 
Election 
County 
(Kreise)  
Region Political Structure of the Weimar Republic - 
Province, 
Federal State 
Members of Protestant 
Churches 
Different Sources 
(ZA8013) 
Resident Population 
1925 Municipality 
Workers Total Census 1925 Resident Population 1925 Municipality 
Workers in Industry 
and Handcraft Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 Municipality 
Unemployed 1933 Census 1933 Resident Population 1933 Municipality 
Urbanization Reichswohnzählung 1927, Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 
Municipalities 
with more than 
5000 
Inhabitants 
Parcel Farmers 
(0 – 2 ha) Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 County 
Small Farmers 
(2– 5 ha) Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 County 
Middle Farmers 
(5 – 20 ha) Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 County 
Large Farmers 
(20 – 100 ha) Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 County 
Large Estate Farmers
(100+ ha) Census 1925 
Resident Population 
1925 County 
-  
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Table 6: Regional Indicator Variable: Assigned Regional Code and Corresponding 
Association of Electoral Districts (Wahlkreisverband) 
Regional-
Code 
Association of 
Electoral Districts 
Provinces of Prussia or Regions / States of the Weimar 
Republic 
1 I Province East Prussia 
3 II, III Province Brandenburg, City Berlin 
4 IV Province Pomerania 
5 III Province Borderland Posen 
6 V Province Lower Silesia 
7 V, (VI)1 Province Upper Silesia 
8 VI Province Saxony 
9 (IV)1, VII Province Schleswig-Holstein, State Lübeck, State Oldenburg: Part Lübeck 
10 (VII)1, VIII Province Hanover, State Hamburg, State Bremen 
11 IX Province Westphalia 
12 (VI)1, (IX)1, X Province Hessen-Nassau, State Waldeck 
13 XI, XII Rhine-province, State Oldenburg: Part Birkenfeld 
15 XIII Bavaria - South Bavaria 
16 XIII, XIV Bavaria - North Bavaria 
17 XIV Bavaria - Pfalz 
18 XV State Saxony 
19 XVI State Württemberg, Province Hohenzollern 
20 XVI State Baden 
21 VI State Thuringia 
22 X State Hessen 
24 IV State Mecklenburg-Schwerin, State Mecklenburg-Strelitz 
25 VIII State Oldenburg without the Parts Lübeck and Birkenfeld 
26 VI, VIII, IX State Braunschweig, State Anhalt, State Lippe, State Schaumburg-Lippe 
1 Association of electoral districts in brackets covers parts of an Association of electoral 
districts which belong to the respective region but represent only minor parts of the 
constructed region and the Association of electoral districts. 
 
Figure 8: Share of Parcel Farmers (0–2 ha) and Election Result of the NSDAP 
33 
 
 
Figure 9: Share of Small Farmers (2–5 ha) and Election Result of the NSDAP 
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Figure 10: Share of Parcel, Small and Middle Farmers (Composite Variable: 0–20 ha) and 
Election Result of the NSDAP 
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Figure 11: Percentage of Protestants in Counties, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 
(1929) and Census 1925 
 
Figure 12: Workforce in Parcel Farms, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929) and
Census 1925 
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Figure 13: Workforce in Small Farms, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929) and
Census 1925 
 
 
Figure 14: Workforce in Large Farms, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929) and
Census 1925 
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Figure 15: Workforce in Large Estates, Sources: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1929) and
Census 1925 
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B. Model Results 
Table 7: Model Results: Point Estimators, Model 1a, see Table 5 for a Description of the 
Regions 
Regional-Code May 24 Dec 24 May 28 Sept 30 Jul 32 Nov 32 Mar 33 
1 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 
3 -0.720 -0.824 0.768 0.084 -0.019 0.110 -0.072 
4 -0.239 -0.448 0.652 0.021 -0.035 0.102 -0.070 
5 0.836 0.800 -0.125 -0.081 0.317 0.445 0.213 
6 -0.778 -0.917 0.662 0.627 0.516 0.604 0.382 
7 -0.093 -0.067 1.321 0.070 0.692 0.773 0.609 
8 -0.218 -0.287 1.291 0.145 0.139 0.147 -0.020 
9 -0.315 -0.850 1.361 0.275 0.299 0.411 0.053 
10 -0.282 -0.475 1.425 0.158 0.083 0.131 -0.098 
11 -0.754 -0.993 0.989 0.031 0.023 0.088 -0.013 
12 -0.225 -0.504 1.614 0.299 0.334 0.501 0.217 
13 -0.514 -0.976 1.439 0.504 0.418 0.439 0.292 
15 1.786 1.349 3.119 0.779 0.542 0.611 0.500 
16 1.380 0.990 2.840 0.609 0.404 0.497 0.242 
17 -0.061 -0.489 2.290 0.558 0.637 0.800 0.397 
18 -0.350 -0.703 1.381 0.132 0.150 0.238 0.012 
19 -0.474 -0.616 0.923 -0.572 -0.393 -0.379 -0.208 
20 -0.091 -0.355 1.572 0.452 0.449 0.503 0.364 
21 0.194 -0.021 1.613 0.059 0.050 0.058 -0.102 
22 -0.873 -1.122 0.872 0.115 0.376 0.465 0.205 
24 0.910 0.739 0.870 -0.162 -0.063 -0.035 -0.240 
25 -0.351 -0.350 2.432 0.440 0.162 0.130 -0.249 
26 -0.009 -0.242 2.025 0.366 0.301 0.406 0.052 
Parameter May 24 Dec 24 May 28 Sept 30 Jul 32 Nov 32 Mar 33 
Intercept -3.210 -3.765 -5.605 -2.070 -0.995 -1.295 -0.463 
Middle Farmers 
(“linear”)2 -1.265 -1.159 -2.104 0.258 1.544 1.817 1.696 
1 reference category 
2 parameters are from the models with linear middle farmers component (1b) 
  
Figure 16: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election May 1924,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1924 – 1928 Elections 
 
 
Figure 17: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election December 1924,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1924 – 1928 Elections 
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Figure 18: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election May 1928,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1924 – 1928 Elections 
 
Figure 19: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election September 1930, 
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1930 – 1933 Elections 
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Figure 20: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election July 1932,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1930 – 1933 Elections 
 
 
Figure 21: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election November 1932,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1930 – 1933 Elections 
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Figure 22: Regional Indicator Variable: Estimated Spatial Effect, Election March 1933,
Centered Around Average Effect, Identical Scale Used for 1930 – 1933 Elections 
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Figure 23: Effect for the Share of Parcel Farmer (0-2 ha), Share of Small Farmer (2-5 ha) 
and Share of Middle Farmer (5-20 ha) [columns], Elections May 1924 - March 1933 [rows] 
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Figure 24: Estimated Smooth Effect of the Share of Large Farmer (20-100 ha), 
Percentage of Protestants and Urbanization [columns] on the Share of the NSDAP, 
Elections May 1924 - March 1933 [rows]
46 
 
 
Figure 25: Estimated Smooth Effect of the Percentage of Workers, Percentage of Workers
in Industry and Handcraft and Percentage of Unemployed (as at: 1933, only for 1932-33 
Elections) [columns] on the Share of the NSDAP, Elections May 1924 - March 1933 
[rows] 
  
Figure 26: Residuals Model 1a, Election September 1930 
 
Figure 27: Residuals Model 1a, Election July 1932 
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Figure 28: Residuals Model 1a, Election November 1932 
 
 
Figure 29: Residuals Model 1a, Election March 1933 
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